WHICH TO ATTACH LOST CHANCE CLAIMS (1) Demonstrable physical injury (2) Pleural plaques as harm (3) Chance/fear of future illness as harm (4) Cumulating de minimis harms to constitute actionable harm E SOME CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent years British jurisprudence is fortunate to have benefi ted from a plentiful supply of case law and academic writing on the requirement of causation in delictual or tortious liability. 1 The relevant decisions and academic writings have
Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review reference to claimable present loss.
Thirdly, the article examines an issue which, given the decisions in Barker and Gregg, is likely to constitute the next causally problematic issue for the House of Lords: what may constitute existing physical harm for the purposes of a damages claim for personal injury? This may not appear, at fi rst glance, to be a causal issue at all. However, its relevance for causation lies in the fact that, so long as some demonstrable existing physical harm can be demonstrated to have been caused by a defender, recovery in respect of causally uncertain future harm can be attached to a claim for damages for the existing harm. The issue arose most recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Grieves v FT Everard & Sons Ltd, 7 considered below. Allied to these causal matters is the issue of apportionment of damages. The issue is related because to say that a defender caused a loss does not fully answer the question of who should be liable for that loss, given that there may be other defenders who are equally deemed to have caused the loss. In such cases of multiple causation of harm the courts have struggled to identify which solution to apportionment of liability is most equitable in different types of case. Inevitably, the need to do justice not just to individuals but to categories of litigant such as victims' groups, or manufacturers, employers and ultimately insurers, has troubled the courts. Because the question of apportionment of liability has featured in many causal cases, the currently applicable rules are also considered below.
B. THE CURRENT LAW ON CAUSATION-IN-FACT AND APPORTIONMENT OF LOSS (1) Sine qua non causation
The position of the sine qua non, or "but for", test as the starting point for the analysis of causation-in-fact in Scots and English Law is well established, a position which has traditionally been seen as uncontroversial. 8 The test has also been accepted as the starting point in the examination of causation-in-fact in most other Western jurisdictions. 9 The test operates by requiring a court to consider, of a possible cause of injury c, whether, but for the operation of that cause, the result r would still have occurred. This is counterfactual analysis:
10 it tests necessity of effect by asking whether or not the result would have occurred in the absence of the given cause. Philosophers call this sense of necessity "strong necessity".
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Because, however, causes do not always operate singly to produce results but can form part of a set of causes (or "conditions") suffi cient to produce a result, and because different sets of causes may equally produce the same result, the concept of necessity also has a weak sense in which it denotes that, while c may not have been necessary for result r, nonetheless c was a necessary member of a set of conditions suffi cient for r.
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Most outcomes are produced by such sets of causes. This, however, is not necessarily productive of diffi culty. Where, for instance, two causes c1 and c2 have cumulatively produced a result of greater magnitude than would have been produced by either cause operating alone, then one can say that but for each of c1 and c2 a specifi c magnitude of the overall harm would have been avoided. Any cause which thus "materially contributes" to the totality an overall injury is a sine qua non cause of that injury, even if it can be shown that the injury would still have occurred to a lesser extent in the absence of that cause. That much was settled by the House of Lords in Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings 13 when it developed the material contribution gloss to the sine qua non test. What that case implies about apportionment of loss is rather more troublesome, as discussed below. More problematic for the sine qua non test are cases of multiple causation where neither c1 nor c2 alone was necessary for r to occur because the other of the causes would have been productive of r to exactly the same degree in any event. For instance:
(i) Two vehicles, driven by D1 and D2 respectively, collide with a pedestrian, P. P is killed. Either collision on its own would have caused P's death. (ii) P is exposed to toxic waste from three different polluters, D1, D2 and D3. P develops cancer. The cancer would have resulted from the toxic effect produced by any one of the polluters acting on its own.
These cases are examples of "duplicative" or "over-determined" causation. 
(2) Risk creation as causation: McGhee v NCB
In McGhee the House of Lords decided that mere risk creation was suffi cient to constitute a causal connection between harmful conduct and injury. The defender was held to have caused the pursuer's dermatitis merely because its behaviour in prolonging his exposure to abrasive dust had increased the risk of his contracting the disease. There was no evidence that, but for the defender's behaviour, the pursuer would not have contracted dermatitis, or would have contracted it in a less severe form. Their Lordships decided, however, that there was no essential difference between the defender's having materially increased the risk that the pursuer would contract dermatitis and having materially contributed to that dermatitis.
As a result of this decision, mere risk creation became suffi cient in certain cases to satisfy a causal connection to actual physical harm. 18 Yet it is hard to see how risk creation can equate to causation. My careless driving may risk injury to pedestrians but does not of itself occasion physical harm unless the vehicle strikes them; my misrepresentation about an individual's creditworthiness may create a risk of fi nancial loss to anyone who lends to that individual but cannot of itself cause actual harm unless such misrepresentation is acted upon by a lender. Creating a risk of harm is not the same as causing that harm. To assert otherwise is a legal fi ction, and a rather unconvincing one at that. The decision in McGhee fundamentally undermined the rule that a connection, demonstrated by counterfactual analysis, was needed between harm and loss before causation could be established. It opened up the possibility that a defender might be held liable for damage which in actuality he had not caused, save in the fi ctional sense of having created the risk of its occurrence. The decision in McGhee to bend the rules of causation was motivated by policy, specifi cally a concern that demonstrably negligent defenders should not be permitted to avoid liability for harm merely because the pursuer was unable, as a result of an inherent unpredictability in the causal chain, to establish causation according to the usual requirements. Concern for pursuers in such a position was doubtless commendable, but an alternative mechanism could have been adopted by which to provide an equitable balancing between the interests of pursuer and defender, namely lost chance recovery. The House of Lords chose not to follow such alternative route, and embarked instead on a risk-based causal analysis which itself ran the substantial risk of future application to even less causally robust facts. approach adopted in McGhee and Fairchild. First, it maintains the traditional rules of causation. Before recovery for a lost chance is permitted, the pursuer must still show that, prior to the defender's fault, there was the chance of avoiding the injury, and that, but for the defender's fault, the pursuer would not have lost that chance. In other words, in a lost chance action the gist of the claim may have changed but the causal requirement has not. Secondly, whereas the material increase in risk test means that a defender may be held liable for an injury which, on a sine qua non basis, he did not actually cause, lost chance recovery provides an equitable via media to the problem of causal uncertainty by compensating only the pursuer's loss of a chance of avoiding the harm, damages being valued by reference to the magnitude of the chance. Thus, if P has lost a one third chance of avoiding injuries valued at £3,000, P recovers only for the value of that chance (one third of £3,000, i.e. £1,000). Such an approach strikes a balance between letting off a defender who may in fact have caused the harm, and penalising a defender who may not have caused the harm at all. Before Barker v Corus, the courts struggled to explain the conceptual difference between recovery for lost chances and for material increase in risk, and what the criteria were for the application of the one rather than the other. Given that the essential issue for both is the same, 26 it seemed anomalous that in material increase in risk cases full recovery for the physical harm was allowed, while in lost chance cases there was recovery only in proportion to the magnitude of the chance. These problems were tackled in the Barker decision.
(4) Causal orthodoxy reasserted: Barker v Corus
It is no exaggeration to describe the Barker decision as the most important development in British causal jurisprudence in the last twenty years. 27 The facts of
Barker were broadly similar to Fairchild, in that Barker had been materially exposed to asbestos during periods of employment with two employers (one of which was now insolvent and without any identifi ed insurer). In addition, however, Barker had suffered a third period of material exposure while self-employed. He died in 1996 from a mesothelioma of the pleura. Assuming that, as in Fairchild, the material increase in risk principle was to be utilised to fi nd the two employers jointly and severally liable for such an indivisible injury, the only solvent and insured defendant, Corus, would bear liability for the whole damages. The House of Lords upheld a damages claim against both employers, but held that each was to be seen as having caused, not the physical harm itself, but only a Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review proportion of the risk of such harm (Mr Barker having also contributed a proportion through his own negligence). Further, and crucially, each defendant was liable only in proportion to the magnitude of the risk of injury to which it had exposed Mr Barker. The second fi nding, concerning apportionment, is discussed later; 28 the fi rst, concerning causation, merits a full examination now.
Whereas in Fairchild the House of Lords had replicated the approach of McGhee in holding the defendants liable in solidum on the basis that each, by contributing a material risk of injury to the claimant, had caused the injury, the majority in Barker recast the McGhee-Fairchild principle as one of loss of a chance. Material increase in risk was no longer to be seen as the equivalent of causing the actual harm, but was to be recognised for what it was: simply causation of the risk of an injury, or, to put it another way, causation of the loss of a chance or opportunity of avoiding that injury. Lord Hoffmann set out the new approach in the leading speech. He argued that, in Fairchild, while a minority had equated material increase in risk with material contribution (the McGhee approach), the majority had taken a different view. 29 Referring to his own speech in Fairchild, he characterised his comparison between material increase in risk and material contribution as simply a legal analogy. Recognising this, it was more consistent to admit that, if the basis of liability was risk creation, then the damage caused ought to be seen not as the injury itself but as the creation of a risk or chance of such injury. Lord Hoffmann justifi ed this new approach to the McGhee-Fairchild principle on the basis of its fairness, saying it would "smooth the roughness of the justice" to defendants.
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Lord Rodger, in the minority, was scornful of attempts to recast the McGheeFairchild principle in terms of loss of a chance. He found the speeches of the majority in McGhee and Fairchild to be quite clear: material increase in risk was to be treated as equivalent to a material contribution to the actual injury caused. Lord Hoffmann was doing nothing more than "rewriting the key decisions in McGhee". 31 Lord Rodger was sceptical that the new approach would be any fairer, as the majority claimed; on the contrary, in an attempt to improve the lot of defendants and their insurers, innocent claimants would often be left only with a small proportion of damages. While, however, Lord Rodger was strictly correct on the interpretation of the earlier authorities, Lord Hoffmann's re-interpretation of those authorities, if somewhat strained, seems justifi ed by the legitimate goals of reasserting causal Where the Barker principle applies, each culpable defender will be held liable in damages only in proportion to the risk of injury which he contributed. This question of apportionment of loss will now be examined.
(5) Apportionment of loss
The basic rule regarding apportionment of liability for loss is not hard to grasp: a defender is liable for the loss he has caused. In the simple case of a sole defender D, so long as the whole of the identifi able and quantifi able loss suffered by the pursuer P has been caused by D alone, D is wholly and solely liable for that loss. Additionally, without there being any other defenders, if P has partly caused the loss, contributory negligence may be pled against him, and, if proved, P's damages must be reduced to the extent a court "thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage". 34 In cases where two defenders D1 and D2 have each contributed to P's loss, and have each caused a clearly identifi able amount of that loss (in other words, the damage is divisible into portions), the basic rule discussed in the previous paragraph equally applies: D1 is solely liable for the portion caused by him, and D2 solely for such portion caused by him. In Scotland this type of liability is called "several", whereas in England the term "joint" liability is used, a difference which is apt to confuse. 35 Of diffi culty for these established rules is Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings.
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Although the disease suffered by the pursuer in this case was divisible (or "dose- Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review related"), so that the defender should only have been liable for the proportionate degree of harm which its culpable contribution to the disease had made, the defender was in fact found liable for the whole of the pursuer's loss. On the assumption that the relative contribution to the severity of the illness added by the defender's negligence was capable of determination, this fi nding seems fl awed; on the other hand, it may be that the state of scientifi c knowledge at the time did not allow a reasonable assessment of the contribution made by the defender's negligence.
The position is different, and more diffi cult, if the harm contributed by each defender is not readily distinguishable or divisible -so-called "indivisible injuries". Common examples include non-dose-related diseases (as occurred in McGhee, Fairchild and Barker), and indivisible physical injuries (such as fractured limbs or death). In such cases, where two or more defenders have contributed to an indivisible injury, liability has traditionally been joint and several, 37 which is to say each defender is liable either for a portion of the whole injury (as determined by the court, if an apportionment is asked for by defenders) or for the whole injury, at the option of the pursuer. In cases where the pursuer seeks recovery of the whole damages from one defender, that defender may subsequently seek to recover a contribution from the other defender or defenders. Such joint and several liability is a deviation from the basic rule outlined earlier, that a defender is liable only for such damage as he has caused, and is designed to avoid the argument that, because the precise extent of the damage caused cannot be shown, no award against the defender should be made. In Fairchild, given the indivisible nature of the disease involved, a fi nding of joint and several liability was, quite properly, made.
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The Barker decision has not changed matters. Because Barker redefi ned the gist of what was being sued for as divisible proportions of the overall risk of harm, the case was essentially about several (in Scots terms) or joint (in English terms) liability for clearly separate and distinguishable injuries. Barker did not therefore disturb the exceptional rule of joint and several liability for indivisible harm: it simply recognised that cases of risk creation are cases of divisible harm, so that the ordinary rule of liability for harm, that a defender is liable only for the damage which he has caused, applies. The adverse effect this would have on a claimant's position in mesothelioma cases has proved highly controversial and is discussed later. 
C. FUTURE LOSSES: GREGG v SCOTT
Not all losses which are the subject of damages claims are demonstrable existing losses at the time the claim is raised. It has long been common for damages claims to relate to losses which, it is argued, will arise later. Of course, there will usually be causal uncertainty surrounding whether losses will or will not arise after the date of a court's determination of liability, for future outcomes are determined in large part by the effects of presently unknowable future behaviour or events. 40 Nonetheless, in some cases courts are willing to infer that, on the balance of probabilities, had the defender not been negligent, a loss would have been avoided in the future, even if such an inference is strictly fi ctional. In such cases, the future loss is treated as if it is a certainty. But, for the most part, future losses must be treated as indeterminate and therefore as having only a certain likelihood that they will occur. Courts assess the likelihood of such uncertain future losses and take this into account when awarding damages.
41

Gregg v Scott
42 involved a claim which related to what might occur in the future. While Mr Gregg argued that the negligence of his general practitioner had occasioned a delay in treatment which in turn had occasioned the enlargement of a malignant tumour, his claim for damages was not for the increase in the size of the tumour, nor indeed for the pain and suffering which such enlargement had caused. Although his claim had begun as an ordinary one for pain and injury consequent on the spread of cancer, 43 it had been reframed as the action proceeded as one for either (i) loss of life expectancy consequent upon the spread of the cancer, or (ii) pure loss of life expectancy, not contingent upon any other loss. The medical evidence indicated that his chances of "survival" (defi ned by the medical experts involved in the case as remission from further adverse effects for ten years from the time of the negligence) had been reduced from 42% to 25% by the delay in treatment. While the reduced life expectancy could be described as a harm which Mr Gregg presently suffered, the ultimate harm which he feared -death caused by cancer -was a future loss which might never occur.
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Mr Gregg's claim was rejected by a 3:2 majority of the House of Lords. This was because the sole damage of which a chance of avoidance had been lost was future damage rather than existing physical damage, and because the doctor's negligence had not been the cause of any loss of a chance of avoiding future damage. and a half years of the ten years which had been regarded by the medical experts as "survival".
Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review further practical reason -that lost chance analysis is too complicated for medical negligence claims -was also adduced. It will be argued that only the fi rst of these reasons stands up to scrutiny.
(1) Future damage not existing physical damage As stated earlier, Scottish and English Law will entertain certain claims in respect of possible future losses. At common law, a claimant can seek a once-and-forall award for all losses, which may include an element for possible future loss. Damages for possible future loss will be assessed according to the risk of its occurring. While claims usually focus on lost future income (patrimonial loss), they may also include an element for future pain and suffering from a possible worsening in the pursuer's physical condition as well as an element for any suffering caused by awareness of loss of life expectancy (non-patrimonial losses). 45 Loss of life expectancy itself, however, is no longer a distinct head of recoverable damages.
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Lost future income is usually compensated by way of a calculation of future lost earnings, so long as the claimant is likely (on the balance of probabilities) to die earlier than he would have done otherwise. Other lost future income may be taken into account too, in particular pension income. It is possible to include lost opportunities of less than 50% likelihood which, on the balance of probabilities, would have come the claimant's way, such as the possibility of more lucrative employment or promotion. Courts must also consider the risk that the claimant would have lost his job through redundancy or some other reason and might therefore have been in a less advantageous position. These considerations have been well settled in the relevant Scots and English cases. 47 When considering such future possibilities, the courts have to evaluate the level of risk of the harm occurring which will shorten the pursuer's life, such level of risk then being factored in when the quantum of damages is assessed. An alternative to the once-and-for-all common law damages award is for a claimant to utilise a statutory provision which permits a provisional damages claim for any existing loss (which might include damages for lost income on account of loss of life expectancy) as well as authorising the claimant to seek further damages in respect of a subsequently occurring serious disease or a serious deterioration in his physical condition if and when this occurs. 48 If the claimant opts to use this statutory route, his provisional award cannot include damages for possible future physical harm, as this future physical harm will be fully compensated by the later claim if and when it is made. The claimant's choice is thus between a once-off, full damages award for all present and possible future loss (future loss being assessed by reference to the risk of its occurring), and a provisional award for all presently suffered loss together with the option of a further claim for physical deterioration should it occur.
Why then could not Mr Gregg have attempted to raise either a common law claim for the risk of future harm, or a statutory claim for provisional damages with the possibility of a later claim for subsequent deterioration? The obstacle lay in the fact that the courts have taken the view that, regardless of which of these two routes is utilised, any claim must follow on the back of a claim for existing demonstrable physical injury. 49 There has to be a present physical loss to which can be attached additional possible future losses. What type of injury can constitute such presently claimable loss is discussed in section D below. Perhaps Mr Gregg might have attempted to argue that the enlargement of his tumour was such existing physical loss. 50 But in the event he claimed merely for reduced life expectancy, with the result that the majority of their Lordships concluded that his claim could not succeed. As the foregoing discussion shows, the courts are not averse to claims for future possible loss per se. Such claims must, however, be attached to a claim for presently suffered physical harm -a requirement which has been adopted, quite reasonably, as a mechanism for controlling speculative lost chance recovery in cases of personal injury. Without it, any party exposed to medical negligence might claim for possible future losses. Consider the following example:
A thousand women aged between 35 and 45 are screened for breast cancer at a hospital. The medical examinations are negligently carried out so that no woman who is at high risk of developing breast cancer is properly identifi ed. The hospital's omission is not discovered for ten years. Medical evidence indicates that such delay creates an increased 15% risk that a woman will suffer from irremediable breast cancer. Can each of the thousand women who have not in any event gone on to develop breast cancer Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review sue in respect of their lost chance of avoiding irremediable breast cancer even if they cannot show any current ill effects? 51 Without the requirement that a future lost chance claim must be tied to a present physical loss, the answer in this example must be yes, at least in the absence of any other factor preventing recovery. On the basis that such claims are undesirable, the requirement makes sense as a mechanism for controlling liability for personal injury, and indeed performs the same function as other limiting requirements such as the requirement of foreseeability of loss in relation to remoteness of damages, and the restrictions placed upon secondary nervous shock claims.
(2) Doctor's negligence not the cause of the loss A second reason suggested in the speeches of the majority in Gregg was that, even if Mr Gregg's claim for loss of life expectancy were to be considered a presently suffered and actionable loss, such loss could not be demonstrated to have been caused by the negligence of his doctor rather than by his pre-existing cancer.
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It is hard to see what precisely is meant here. Of course the available evidence could not permit a determination of whether the loss of life expectancy had been caused by the delay in diagnosis or treatment (possible cause 1) or whether such delay made no difference because the loss of life expectancy would have resulted in any event because of Mr Gregg's pre-existing cancer (possible cause 2). But this is precisely the causal uncertainty that existed in Fairchild, where it could not be proved whether the mesothelioma had been caused during Mr Fairchild's fi rst period of exposure to asbestos (possible cause 1) or during one of the subsequent periods of exposure (possible causes 2, 3, etc). In both Gregg and Fairchild there existed the same kind of inherent uncertainty about the cause of the loss, a view which is confi rmed by the recasting in Barker of the Fairchild and McGhee decisions as loss of a chance claims. To assert, as Lord Hoffmann and Lady Hale do in Gregg, that Mr Gregg's claim must fail because of the uncertainty surrounding what caused his loss of life expectancy would logically lead to the conclusion that the claims in McGhee, Fairchild and Barker ought also to have failed. Moreover, to assert that a difference lies in the fact that in Gregg the claimant was already suffering from cancer before the negligent act whereas in Fairchild the claimant was healthy, is to rely upon an irrelevant distinction. This re-establishing orthodoxy in the realm of causation Vol 11 2007 distinction does not change the nature of the inherent uncertainty in each case, which lies in our inability, in the state of current medical knowledge, to determine whether the loss was due to the defender's negligence or to another factor capable of causing the harm.
This second ground for denying liability must be considered fl awed. In the light of Barker, a denial of future Gregg-type claims on the basis that the identity of the proper cause of the harm is uncertain cannot be maintained. That type of uncertainty is of the very nature of a loss of a chance claim.
(3) Loss of chance analysis too diffi cult for medical negligence cases
Lord Phillips, following a complicated analysis of the differing prospects of Mr Gregg's avoiding different adverse consequences, concluded that the complexities involved in determining the various chances of the different outcomes was a policy factor mitigating against introducing lost chance recovery into medical negligence claims: "A robust test which produces rough justice may be preferable to a test that on occasion will be diffi cult, if not impossible, to apply with confi dence in practice." 
(4) Conclusion
In conclusion, what would give genuine cause for concern about setting manageable bounds of recovery were a Gregg-type case to give rise to liability would be neither that the action would be for loss of a chance per se (for Barker shows that such recovery in personal injury claims is now possible), nor that there would be uncertainty as to who caused the loss of a chance (for such uncertainty is precisely of the essence of lost chance recovery). Rather, the cause for concern would lie in the fact that lost chance recovery shorn of any requirement of attachment to existing physical loss would lead to a massive expansion in liability founded purely on indeterminate causal connection to ultimate future harm. Given the huge increase in the volume and scope of claims which might arise, and the consequent negative impact upon liability costs for both private insurers and the National Health Service, 55 it does not seem unreasonable that the courts have continued to characterise Gregg-type loss of a chance claims as posing a danger to manageable personal injury liability.
56
D. THE SEARCH FOR NEW TYPES OF ACTIONABLE LOSS ON TO WHICH TO ATTACH LOST CHANCE CLAIMS (1) Demonstrable physical injury
As discussed in the previous section, one approach which the claimant in Gregg might have taken would have been to argue that there had been demonstrable existing physical injury by virtue of the fact that his cancerous tumour had increased in size. 57 Given this possible approach, a crucial point for future cases becomes:
what counts as demonstrable physical injury? The notion of "injury" requires, of course, that there be an injurious effect upon the pursuer, which might be constituted by pain and suffering, or by external physical manifestation even in the absence of pain. A deformed or missing limb clearly constitutes injury, as does a scar, scratch, burn, or even change in skin pigmentation. All are external and visible. What, however, of mere internal biological or cellular alteration, not attended by pain or suffering, not productive of adverse symptoms, and not of itself indicative of any likely future harm? Can such internal biological or cellular alteration count as physical injury, whether though medical negligence did not cause the plaintiff any physical ill effects, damages were nonetheless to be awarded for the patient's deprivation of life expectancy and resultant anxiety. 57 Although Lord Hoffmann seemed to doubt that simple enlargement of a tumour was physical injury at all: see [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 87. re-establishing orthodoxy in the realm of causation Vol 11 2007 considered on its own or taken together with other factors? Older authorities on this matter are not especially helpful, as, in the days before x-ray technology, internal injury which had no consequential external manifestation or symptoms of pain was not detectable. For that reason injury in early legal authority is conceived of in terms of visible defect or pain. However, it was precisely the question of internal asymptomatic change which was raised by the most recent asbestos litigation, Grieves v FT Everard & Sons Ltd.
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Each of the claimants in Grieves had been negligently exposed by one of the defendants to asbestos fi bres and consequently developed pleural plaques or pleural thickening. 59 In themselves, both conditions are benign and do not lead directly to any other condition, 60 whether benign or malignant. However, the presence of pleural plaques or pleural thickening can indicate a cumulative level of asbestos exposure at which there is a heightened risk of further asbestosrelated diseases. It was argued that this exposure to asbestos put the claimants at an increased risk of developing mesothelioma at some future stage, as well as causing them to suffer from fear of contracting mesothelioma and, in the case of the fi rst appellant, a depressive psychiatric illness resulting from such fear. The claimants sought to use the pleural plaques as a hook on which to attach these further "injuries". The Court of Appeal rejected the claims, holding by a majority that: (i) the development of pleural plaques was insuffi ciently signifi cant of itself to constitute damage on which a claim in negligence could be founded, nor was that position altered by attaching a further claim in respect of increased risk of contracting a future illness or fear of so doing; (ii) no claim could be made in respect of the chance of contracting a future disease if that was not consequent on some physical injury; and (iii) fear of future illness was not of itself a freestanding head of damage and, in the case of the appellant suffering a psychiatric illness, this was unforeseeable so far as the defendant in question was concerned. It is suggested that the Court of Appeal was correct in holding both that pleural plaques are not suffi ciently injurious per se, unless they occasion some physical discomfi ture or other adverse symptom, and that fear of illness or the risk of future harm are not types of injury which can be claimed in the absence of some form of actionable physical injury. 61 That is enough to conclude that the decision As pleural plaques and pleural thickening are essentially variations of the same kind of internal cellular mutation, they are referred to in this text simply by reference to the former term. 60 In 1% of cases pleural plaques can cause respiratory discomfort, but this is not serious. No physical ill effects were caused by the doctor's negligence. Despite the absence of any such physical was correct. On the further point that de minimis harms 62 cannot be cumulated to constitute actionable harm, it is suggested that the court overstated matters somewhat. Many de minimis types of harm can be cumulated in assessing the pursuer's overall state. However, the rule against cumulating lost chances and fear of illness with de minimis harm seems to be an exception to this rule, so that, on the specifi c facts of the case, accumulation was impermissible and the conclusion of the court correct.
(2) Pleural plaques as harm
Given that, save in exceptional cases, pleural plaques produce neither physical sensation nor any other physical effect, the conclusion of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Grieves was that they are not actionable damage. The opposite conclusion was reached by Smith LJ, who argued that (i) in that small percentage of pleural plaque cases which are attended by physical discomfi ture, pleural plaques are considered harm, so that in such cases it cannot be the symptoms which are the injury but the plaques themselves, and (ii) visible benign tissue change can constitute harm, and there is no reason to treat internal tissue changes differently. These two points are, at fi rst blush, challenging for the majority's view, but it is suggested that they can be adequately countered. First, when assessing whether an injury has occurred, the courts usually consider physical change and pain together. Pain by necessity requires the presence of physical change, even if this is merely at the level of cellular change, nerve impulse, or muscular or vascular contraction. A migraine headache, for instance, is the result of vascular contraction affecting blood fl ow to the brain. Physical alteration is not always attended by pain, however. I may be knocked over yet suffer no pain, even if some cellular alteration will have occurred as a result of the fall. In such a case, I have not been injured, at least in a way that constitutes more than de minimis harm. The purpose of looking for pain or suffering when physical alteration occurs is to see whether that alteration is suffi ciently serious. Secondly, if external physical alteration occurs without pain, a court may nonetheless consider that serious enough of itself to constitute harm, but this is because the courts see a difference between painless alterations which are internal and those which are external. More value is attached to external physical alterations because our personalities are defi ned "hook" on which to hang his claim, Mr Philp was awarded damages for reduced life expectancy and for his distress. Specifi c reference was made by the court to the allegedly analogous case of common awards for "the risk that an injured plaintiff may in the future develop arthritis in an injured joint". 62 By de minimis harms must be understood harms which do not make a material contribution to the injury sustained. re-establishing orthodoxy in the realm of causation Vol 11 2007 in large part by the appearance we present to the world. The conclusion of the majority in Grieves that asymptomatic, internal cellular change is not suffi ciently injurious to sound in damages is a perfectly reasonable one.
In apparent contrast to the conclusion of the majority in Grieves, the Court of Session has taken the view that negligently caused pleural plaques are of themselves injurious, holding them actionable in the presence of other harm. Unfortunately, in neither of the relevant decisions was there any substantial consideration as to whether pleural plaques constitute injury per se: it was simply assumed that they do. 63 Given this fact, the position of the Scottish courts on pleural plaques as injurious per se cannot be seen as settled, and it is likely that the consideration by the House of Lords of the matter in the forthcoming Grieves appeal will be determinative of the question on both sides of the border.
(3) Chance/fear of future illness as harm 64 From the earlier discussion of Fairchild and Gregg, it will be plain that the House of Lords is presently unwilling to treat a mere chance of contracting a future illness, unconnected to any presently suffered physical loss, as actionable. The likelihood of a short term change in this view is small, even if it were to be thought desirable.
As for fear of future illness as freestanding harm, mental distress caused by an existing physical injury may certainly be claimable as damages, this falling in Scotland within the claim for solatium. Additionally, mental distress caused by a fear that a current injury may worsen or may lead to further deleterious consequences can also be something for which damages may be awarded. However, both in Scotland and England, mental distress which is not consequent upon an existing physical harm is not claimable. For example, if P is exposed by D to radiation, and suffers no immediate physical harm, but fears that he may develop leukaemia in the future, this fear is not something for which damages may be sought. As with the risk of contracting a future illness, the requirement that fear of harm be attached to an existing physical harm provides a policy-inspired brake upon personal injury liability, ensuring that large numbers of wholly speculative claims are precluded. The view of the majority in Grieves was that there was no authority beyond fi rst instance decisions for "aggregating three heads of claim which, individually, could not found a cause of action, so as to constitute suffi cient damage to give rise to a legal claim." 65 Certainly this is true if the heads of claim relate to harms lacking in adverse physical effect and which would be unclaimable individually. More controversial, however, is the inference that it is impermissible to aggregate a number of de minimis harms, each on its own causing an adverse (if minor) physical effect. Such circumstances might arise in cases either of single or multiple defenders. Take, for instance, a case where twenty polluters each release de minimis levels of pollution into a river, and the cumulative effect is that a farmer's herd of cattle is poisoned. Ought a claim in delict against each of the defenders to be barred? If no action lies in such a case, then, given the overall totality of harm infl icted upon the victim, the purpose of the law of delict to enforce restorative justice is arguably being thwarted.
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Upholding that purpose suggests that courts ought to have regard to the totality of the harm in order to decide whether P has been harmed by D, or by D1, D2, D3, etc. For physical harms, aggregation ought thus to be possible, if it is not so presently. The farmer ought to have an action against the twenty polluters for the indivisible harm of the death of his cattle, regardless of the fact that the contribution of each was de minimis; and the liability of the twenty should be joint and several. However, it does seem from the earlier discussion that some types of harm, including fear of harm and lost opportunities of avoiding future physical harm, cannot be aggregated with physical harm unless that harm is more than merely de minimis. This is a reasonable policy-based exception to what should be the normal ability of pursuers to ask a court to consider the totality of the harm they have suffered. The policy exists because the court considers bodily, physical harm to be the most serious type of harm. If a pursuer wishes to use it as a hook on which to hang other non-physical injuries, such as a reduced likelihood of avoiding future harm, that physical harm should be serious enough, of itself, to be actionable.
E. SOME CONCLUSIONS
In recent case law, questions of causation, apportionment of damage, and actionable injury have posed intellectually challenging problems of the most fundamental importance in the law of delict and tort. As a result, the following may now be taken as settled.
In the fi rst place, it is preferable to analyse a material increase in the risk of harm as causation of the risk, such risk of harm being seen as the actionable damage. This view, asserted by the House of Lords in Barker, has reconciled the divergent streams of material increase in risk and lost chance claims, and has re-established causal orthodoxy after thirty years of wayward analysis following McGhee.
Secondly, having confi rmed that lost chance recovery is the rock upon which many cases of causal uncertainty is founded, the House of Lords has clarifi ed that, where the identity of the person causing the harm is in doubt, lost chance recovery imposes not joint and several liability upon defenders for the whole of the pursuer's loss, but merely several liability upon each defender for the extent of the risk of harm that he has caused.
Thirdly, a claim for loss of future expectancies or avoidance of future harm is only maintainable in the presence of existing physical injury suffered by the pursuer or claimant. In reaffi rming this view, the House of Lords in Gregg has sensibly avoided opening up personal injury law to merely speculative claims of future harm.
The appeal in Grieves is due to come before the House of Lords at some point during 2007. It is to be hoped that their Lordships will take the opportunity to reaffi rm the view of the Court of Appeal that a claimant cannot cumulate otherwise de minimis claims for lost expectancy or anxiety with physical harm which he has suffered if that physical harm is itself merely de minimis, and that symptomatic pleural plaques are not suffi ciently injurious of themselves to constitute actionable harm, despite the fact that they were frequently treated as such by the legal profession for the twenty years or so prior to the Grieves litigation. Both of these conclusions of the Court of Appeal are justifi able by sound policy reasons relating to the appropriate boundaries of personal injury law.
It is worth concluding by noting that, given recent newsprint generated by asbestos liability cases, it is unsurprising that interested parties such as victims' compensation groups lobbied both the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments for legislative change to improve the rights of negligently-caused mesothelioma sufferers. In May 2006, Des McNulty MSP proposed a Member's Bill before the Scottish Parliament which would have had the effect of amending section 1(2) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 in relation to claims by relatives of injured persons. 67 That Bill ran out of parliamentary time, but the proposal was Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review subsequently adopted by the Scottish Executive as the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Bill and is now before the Scottish Parliament. 68 On the separate question of the apportionment of liability issue raised by the Barker decision, the Scottish Parliament voted to allow Westminster to legislate on a UK-wide basis. This was achieved in section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006, 69 which reinstates joint and several liability in respect of the causation of asbestosrelated mesothelioma of the pleura, 70 thereby reversing that aspect of the Barker decision. 71 Defenders may continue to seek an apportionment of liability inter se, and awards may be reduced in respect of contributory negligence. 72 Additionally, in order to protect properly insured defenders from bearing the burden of liability in cases where co-defenders are uninsured, and thus potentially unable to meet their liability, the statute provides for Treasury regulations to set up a compensation fund from which defenders may seek a contribution in respect of the portion of total liability due by co-defenders unable to pay.
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Whilst this legislative development has, on the face of it, restored an unfairness pinpointed by the majority in Barker, namely that joint and several liability in cases of indeterminate causation imposes upon defenders liability in solidum for losses which, in actuality, they may not have not caused at all, the sting has been taken out of the tail through provision of a statutory compensation fund to ensure that solvent and insured defenders are not forced to bear the burden of insolvent or uninsured co-defenders. This seems a reasonable compromise which should satisfy victims' groups as well as employers and insurers. The legislation has sensibly not sought to undo Barker's general realignment of material increase in risk cases as lost chance cases, nor has it tampered with the rules of causation in mesothelioma cases. It remains to be seen whether such realignment will fi nd favour within the academic community, but it has been suggested in this article that, for reasons of causal orthodoxy, the approach of the majority in Barker should be welcomed.
